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Abstract—The need to consider how systems can be
made resilient to failure modes has gained increasing
traction in the fields of systems thinking and systems
design, and is now more widely studied, with authors
identifying the potential disruptive effects of failure upon a
system, and codifying these disruptions into specific
types. When the focus of specification moves from the
bounded single system to the consideration of capability
and effect, systems-of-systems, rather than systems must
be contended with. Systems-of-systems have been
classified as being of a number of types (acknowledged,
collaborative, directed, virtual, for example), whilst
authors have endeavoured to characterise the properties
of systems-of-systems, and the difficulties associated with
their design, introduction and operation. This study has
invariably arrived at the conclusion that systems-of-
systems are infinitely more complex than bounded single
systems, and as the final system-of-systems design will
still need to be resilient to failure, this in turn poses more
difficult questions for the study of resilience, as the
properties of a bounded single system are unlikely to be
the same as those of a system-of-systems. This paper will
consider the problems faced by the need to specify
resilience in a system-of-systems environment, by first
evaluating how the various types and properties of
systems-of-systems might affect the consideration of
resilience, and then proposes an initial codification of
systems-of-systems resilience disruption types, along
with recommendations and required further work.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The move towards specifying, designing, and procuring
‘capability’ rather than constituent platforms over the past
decade or so has led necessarily to the consideration of more
complex and intricate systems and system requirements [1-3].
This in turn has caused academics and practitioners to focus on
not just systems, but systems-of-systems. This shift has caused
a number of issues when considering the problem: if we take,
for example, definitions of the terms ‘system’ and ‘system-of-
systems’ from the same source – Systems Engineering Book of
Knowledge (SEBoK) [4] – then ‘system’ is defined as a
“combination of interacting elements organized to achieve one
or more stated purposes” [5], whilst ‘system-of-systems’ is
defined as “System‐of‐systems applies to a system‐of‐interest
whose system elements are themselves systems; typically these
entail large scale inter‐disciplinary problems with multiple,
heterogeneous, distributed systems” [6]. It can be seen from
these definitions that whilst a system is a bounded set of
interacting elements focused on the attainment of a given
outcome, then a system-of-systems is a combination of
individual, holistic systems interacting in a particular way at a
particular time. As such, it is reasonable to suggest that each
individual system will exist to its own set of requirements,
purpose, lifecycle, and have its own ownership and priorities.
Combining such systems to achieve a particular outcome might
thus necessarily bring different systems into conflict with each
other. Thus the task of specifying, designing, managing and
regulating such a large entity might be seen to be of a higher
order of complexity and difficulty. This is even more so when
engineering within the capability domain, as we may be
considering not just a system-of-systems, but multiples thereof:
systems-of-systems. How, for example, in a world ever-more
obsessed with the mantra ‘faster, cheaper, better’ [7], are
increasingly complex systems to be specified and designed [8]
in an agile manner? [9]. Moreover, how can such complex
systems-of-systems be made to operate reliably, and be as
available and maintainable as is necessary across time? Whilst
reliability is well defined in literature, for example “Reliability
is a characteristic of the item, expressed by the probability that
it will perform its required function under given conditions for
a stated time interval” [10], the unpredictable and extended
nature of systems-of-systems can prevent availability of
knowledge required to calculate reliability. This lack of
definitive calculations raises the topic of resilience, which can
be defined as “the ability of a system, process, or organisation
to react to, survive, and recover from disruptions” [11]. The
very heterogeneity of systems-of-systems makes the question
of resilience of great importance. To this end, there has been a
growing interest in the topic of systems resilience [12], but
until recently this has been focused at the systems- rather than
system(s) of systems-level. There has been increasing focus on
the problems associated with implementing system-of-systems
[13-15], and also a move toward attempting to understand what
resilience means for systems-of-systems [11, 16, 17]. However,
this area of research remains relatively new, and what
resilience means in a systems-of-systems environment is still
an emerging topic. To this end, this paper attempts to
understand the nature of types of disruptions to which systems-
of-systems might need to be resilient, and then to propose an
initial codification of systems-of-systems resilience disruption
types. Recommendations and further work will then set out
how these ideas might be taken forward.
II. SYSTEMS-OF-SYSTEMS DEFINITIONS
Before examining the nature of resilience and existing
work on disruptions, it is useful to briefly define the concept
of ‘system-of-systems’, to set out the challenges faced in
codifying the nature of disruptions. There have been several
definitions postulated, examples of which are described
below:
“systems‐of‐interest whose system elements are themselves
systems; typically these entail large‐scale inter‐disciplinary
problems involving multiple, heterogeneous, distributed
systems. These interoperating collections of component
systems usually produce results unachievable by the individual
systems alone” [18]
“An SoS is defined as a set or arrangement of systems that
results when independent and useful systems are integrated
into a larger system that delivers unique capabilities” [19]
“a system-of-systems is a super system comprised of elements
that are themselves complex, independent systems which
interact to achieve a common goal” [20]
“An organised collection of interacting systems” [21]
From these definitions we can identify certain characteristics
of system-of-systems which are likely to render the
specification of resilience more challenging. These might be
summarised as described at Table 1.
TABLE 1: System-of-systems Characteristics
Characteristic Observation
Emergent Behaviour An SoS is capable of tasks that
the individual systems cannot
achieve. This emergent
behaviour is not always
predictable and can have
positive or negative outcomes
Complexity SoS have complex interactions
and dependencies. These
interactions will change
depending on the SoS
configuration
Independence Each component system of an
SoS has its own purpose, and
can be used independently of
the SoS
Geography There is a tendency to
geographical dispersion
Sub-optimalisation Each element has not been
designed with the SoS purpose
in mind
These characteristics present issues for the engineering of
system-of-systems, especially when compared to systems.
Considerations for engineering and design of such factors
have been documented [22-24] as at Table 2.
TABLE 2: Design and Engineering comparison between
systems and System-of-Systems, taken from [22]
Boundaries
and
Interfaces
Focuses on
boundaries and
interfaces
Focus on identifying
systems contributing to
SoS objectives and
enabling flow of data,
control and functionality
across the SoS while
balancing needs of the
systems OR focus on
interactions between
systems. Difficult to
define system-of-interest
Performance
and
Behaviour
Performance
of the system
to meet
performance
objectives
Performance across the
SoS that satisfies SoS use
capability needs while
balancing needs of the
systems
Metrics Well defined
(e.g., INCOSE
handbook [6])
Difficult to define, agree,
and quantify
III. EXAMINING CLASSIFICATIONS OF SYSTEMS-OF-SYSTEMS
As a means to further understand system-of-systems in the
light of difficulties in characterizing and specifying them, types
of systems have also been examined [25, 23], and can be
described as follows [15]:
“Directed - The SoS is created and managed to fulfil
specific purposes and the constituent systems are subordinated
to the SoS. The component systems maintain an ability to
operate independently; however, their normal operational
mode is subordinated to the central managed purpose.
Acknowledged - The SoS has recognised objectives, a
designated manager, and resources for the SoS; however, the
constituent systems retain their independent ownership,
objectives, funding, and development and sustainment
approaches. Changes in the systems are based on cooperative
agreements between the SoS and the system.
Collaborative - The component systems interact more or
less voluntarily to fulfil agreed upon central purposes. The
central players collectively decide how to provide or deny
service, thereby providing some means of enforcing and
maintaining standards.
Virtual - The SoS lacks a central management authority
and a centrally agreed upon purpose for the system-of-systems.
Large-scale behavior emerges—and may be desirable—but this
type of SoS must rely on relatively invisible mechanisms to
maintain it.”
This classification can usefully be employed in considering
how resilience might be adapted to the systems-of-systems
context.
IV. THE NEED FOR RESILIENCE
A. The Importance of Resilience
Increasing complexity and interdependencies in systems-of-
systems has increased the potential for disruptive events to
interact with element(s) of the constituent systems within a
system(s)-of-systems [26]. As a result, there are likely to exist
more opportunities for disruptions to occur at system(s)-of-
systems level of abstraction. Moreover, as system(s)-of-
systems become more pervasive and critical, disruptions will
generate more significant impacts:
• Loss of system function
• Negative emergent properties
• Safety implications
In relation to a disruptive event, a system will need to contain
one or more of absorptive, adaptive, and restorative capacities
[12]. However, a system’s capacity for resilience is necessarily
dependent upon both its boundary, and the nature of the effect
that is being disruptive. Given the larger, more diverse and
heterogeneous nature of system(s)-of-systems, the possibility
of a disruptive episode at either system- or supersystem-level
must therefore be greater.
B. Existing Understanding of Resilience
Disruptive events, described above, are the principal reason
for requiring resilience. Without these events, there would be
no need for resilience. A ‘disruption’ can be defined as: an
event or situation that interacts with the system of interest and
has the potential to modify the system’s emergent properties
and measures of performance. Such disruptions can be
categorised as follows [12]:
• Type A: Disruptions of Input
• Type B: Systemic disruptions
In both cases, these disruptions can be predicted or
unpredicted. Type A disruptions, as shown in Figure 1, are
from outside the system, and tend to cause a loss of system
function.
Figure 1: Notional system, sub-systems, and related systems with Type A
and B disruptions indicated
These are environmentally driven, and can be some of the
easiest disruptions to identify, especially those from the
physical environment; examples might be:
• Natural disasters/ extreme weather
• Hostile military action
Knowledge of these Type A disruptions initially drives
absorptive capacity requirements, such as survivability
parameters of a platform system such as an armoured vehicle.
There are 8 principal environments that can generate Type A
disruptions [12]: Cultural, Political, Economic, Organisational,
Regulatory, Geopolitical, Contractual, and Physical.
Type B disruptions, on the other hand, are disruptions that
are systemically realized. They are internal to the system and
originate in either system elements or emerge from interactions
between two or more elements/ sub-systems. They are
commonly, but not exclusively, reliability or safety failures
[12]. As with the Type A family, Type B disruptions generate
loss of function, capability or capacity and are classified by
[12] as follows:
• Component Failure
• Systems Failure
Component Failures are the result of a failure of a system
element/ subsystem (for example through unreliability),
whereas the Systems Failure classification relates to the
negative emergence from two or more elements interacting in
some way, for example incorrectly applied management
interventions or frictional wear through poor engineering
design. They tend to be most evident in technological systems,
as diagnosis is often simpler, although any system is capable of
internally generating Type B disruptions.
V. RESILIENCE IN SYSTEM(S)-OF-SYSTEMS
System resilience is considered to be at the cutting edge of
systems engineering research, and the topic continues to evolve
quickly. Resilience for System(s)-of-systems, given the
sometimes opaque nature of the concept, is even less well-
defined. As presented earlier, there is recent research into the
area [11, 16, 17], especially within the systems safety and
disaster management domains [27, 28], but as yet there are few
defined rules or approaches.
If, however, we look at how resilient systems are treated,
implications for applying the concept at the SoS level can be
discerned. Given that resilience capacities described earlier are
necessary in a system to combat disruptive events, a system-of-
systems should similarly be expected to absorb, adapt, and/or
recover from disruptions to exhibit resilience. However, not all
system(s)-of-systems are intentionally designed or engineered.
This raises two questions:
• How do we ensure the system(s)-of-systems is resilient?
• Can we ensure that it continues to be resilient?
This could be seen to depend on the type of system(s)-of-
systems. An illustration of this [26] is provided at Figure 2. An
additional type, that of accidental, has been added to account
for the possibility of involuntary, or chance, system(s)-of-
systems occurrences.
Figure 2: Ability to engineer resilient capacity within system(s)-of-systems [26]
As can be seen from Figure 2, the ability to successfully
engineer resilience into a system(s)-of-systems decreases as the
type of system(s)-of-systems becomes less well-regulated, and
more loosely configured. So, for example, a directed
system(s)-of-systems, created to fulfil a specific purpose, and
centrally managed and coordinated to that end, is definable,
and therefore potentially quantifiable in terms of the necessary
resilience required to combat any disruptive event(s). This
might also be true, although to a slightly lesser extent, for an
acknowledged system(s)-of-systems, with its recognised
objectives, designated manager, and resources. However, a
collaborative system(s)-of-systems, relying upon voluntary
agreements to function, is likely to be much more challenging
to define in terms of required resilience, and by the time we get
to virtual and accidental system(s)-of-systems, the emergent
nature of component systems and interrelationships between
them would render a quantification of resilience continuous
and ever-changing.
VI. CODIFYING DISRUPTIONS FOR SYSTEM(S)-OF-SYSTEMS
In considering the nature of disruptions, and the dynamic
and detailed complexity exhibited by different types of
system(s)-of-systems, it is reasonable to suggest that whilst the
component systems themselves may be resilient, the act of
bringing them together in a new system(s)-of-systems-
architecture greatly increases the chance of disruptions
generated through the relationships/ interconnection between
the systems. Given the fundamental nature of system-of-
systems being comprised of independent systems, any
engineered resilience at this level only focuses on the
continuation of delivering its own system function during times
of disruption. Consequently, any action taken will be done in
isolation of the other constituent systems, meaning that
decisions are not likely to be optimised for the system-of-
systems as a whole, leading to conflicting actions at either end
of a relationship/ interconnection between systems, raising the
potential for the generation of disruptions at this point of the
system-of-systems.
Whilst there is scope, at the Directed- and Acknowledged-
system-of systems levels, for the single point of managerial
control/ oversight to optimise and guide how the constituent
systems respond to disruptions, this is not an option for
Collaborative and Virtual Systems-of-Systems. This is due to
the lack of a single individual holding the role of management
authority for these system-of-systems types.
This lack of control has implications for the codification of
disruption types at the system-of-systems level, since control
and ownership now become important factors in being able to
respond to disruptions. The expansion of the system-of-systems
boundary from the collection of constituent system boundaries
means that it is exposed to a wider array of potential
environments from which disruptions can originate. Applying
this to the Type A disruptions means that at the system-of-
systems level, two distinct variations of Type A disruption
sources manifest:
 Those that are external to a system boundary, apply to a
system, but may originate from within the System-of-
Systems Boundary;
 Those that are external to the system-of-system boundary,
and apply to the system-of-systems as an entity.
The first of these situations would, from the perspective of
a system owner, remain a Type A disruption given it is a
disruption of input to their system. However, from the wider
system-of-systems perspective, it cannot be considered a Type
A disruption as it originates within the SoS boundary, meaning
it is not a disruption of input to the SoS. Given it does not
emerge from the internal systems or their interconnections; this
disruption is also not of the Type B class. In effect it lies
somewhere in between, and is able to evolve depending upon
the level of systemic hierarchy used as the observation. It is
therefore proposed by the authors that such disruptions are a
new and previously unexamined type, unique to system-of-
systems that have no central management oversight. We label
these Type C disruptions, and call them ‘Internal Environment
Disruptions’.
The second of the situations highlighted above would also
be perceived as a Type A disruption at the system level due to
its origination from outside of the system boundary. As it also
originates from outside the SoS boundary, it remains a Type A
disruption when also viewed from the SoS perspective.
However, the constituent environments that comprise these
disruption types are likely to be more strategic in nature, given
their wide ranging influence on the entire system-of-systems.
This is especially true once the geographically dispersed
nature of SoS, as highlighted in Table 1, is considered.
Therefore, whilst these disruptions mimic the 8 system-level
Type A environments from [12], they are likely to have a
more limited number of disruptions that arise from each
environment due to their system-of-systems level influence.
We therefore consider that whilst such disruptions remain
Type A, they are a variant of those found at the systems level.
We therefore refer to them as Type A1 disruptions, which are
applicable only to Collaborative and Virtual system-of-
systems. We call these ‘Strategic Disruptions of Input’. An
example of such a Type A1 disruption would be a change in
the Rules of Engagement for a joint coalition military
operation comprising several countries and many different
types of units.
As with the exploration of applying the system level Type
A disruption approach to collaborative systems-of-systems, we
have also examined how Type B disruptions apply when
considered within these entities.
As Type B disruptions at the system level are disruptions
generated by either component/ subsystem or system failure,
when the concept is applied to the system-of-systems level, it
remains valid, except the approach considers systems and inter-
system failures. As such, it suggests a hierarchical
consideration of Type B disruptions could be one way of
treating these disruption types at the system-of-systems-level.
This means that the system- and systems-of-systems-level
Type B disruptions are essentially identical in terms of concept
and content. However, as with our examination of Type A
disruptions, the issue of system control and likely generation
source of the Type B disruptions at the different hierarchical
levels are the consideration in how they are codified. To
distinguish between those at the systems level and those at the
system-of-systems level, we label those system-of-systems
systemic disruptions as Type D disruptions and call them
‘Disruptions of Emergence.’
An illustration of the four disruption types in relation to the
notional system from Figure 1 and wider system-of-system
boundary is shown by Figure 3, and expanded by Table 3.
Figure 3: Notional system from Figure 1, with system-of-systems boundary
and suggested additional types of disruption
TABLE 3: System-of-systems Disruption Types
Disruption
Type and
Name
Description Examples
A1 – Strategic
Disruption of
Input
Disruptions that
originate outside the
SoS boundary and
impacts all constituent
systems within the SoS.
1. Funding shortfall
for whole SoS
2. Rules of
Engagement
change for a
coalition
operation
B – Systemic
Disruptions
‘Local’ disruption that
originates within a
constituent system.
Two sources:
1. Failure of a system
element/ subsystem
2. Failure from negative
emergence from two
or more interacting
elements
1. Unreliable
component within
constituent system
2. Incorrect use of
constituent system
from poorly
trained operator
C – Internal
Environmental
Disruption
‘Local’ disruption that
originates inside the
SoS boundary but
outside constituent
system boundaries.
Impacts one or more
constituent systems.
1. Funding shortfall
for a constituent
system
2. Enemy attack on
single constituent
system
D –
Disruption of
Emergence
Disruption generated by
negative emergence
from the interaction of
two or more constituent
systems within the SoS.
1. Sensor interference
within a Coalition
Task Group
2. Language
difficulties between
constituent systems
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
From our research conducted so far, we have found that the
unique nature and challenges of collaborative systems-of-
systems prevents optimal application of many of the accepted
and, often basic assertions, associated with resilience
engineering. Simple resilience concepts, whilst applicable to
systems-of-systems generically, begin to become nebulous
when faced with challenges over control and ownership. This is
an important consideration that must be factored into future
exploration of the nature of resilient systems-of-systems as
assumptions, whilst appropriate for systems and the more
tightly controlled systems-of-systems that are categorised as
directed or acknowledged, fail to comprehensively describe or
apply to the less centralised collaborative and virtual systems-
of-systems.
In this paper we have considered the nature and codification
of disruption types when considered and applied at the
systems-of-systems level. We start with those disruption types
presented within [12] for application at a system level, and
propose an extension of this codification for application at the
systems-of-systems level, specifically focusing on those
systems-of-systems that exhibit no single point of management
oversight or control (i.e. collaborative and virtual systems-of-
systems). In doing so we propose the requirement for an
evolution of the existing Type A disruptions into those that are
more ‘strategic’ in nature – the Type A1 disruptions. Two new
types of disruption – Type C and Type D – are proposed to fill
the gaps in disruption sources for complex systems-of-systems
that are not filled by either current Type A and Type B
families.
Whilst originating from the same consideration of Type A
disruptions upon the system-of-system environment,
differences between the Type A1 and Type C disruption types
are likely to be more marked given their relative positioning
across the system-of-systems. Type A1 disruptions are a subset
of Type A disruptions specifically codified to demonstrate the
strategic nature of the disruption. Type C however represents
something new and is unique to the less centralised system-of-
systems environments found in their collaborative and virtual
subtypes. Whilst undoubtedly related to the system level Type
A (and system-of-systems Type A1), the main differentiator is
the positing and ability to influence the disruption source. As it
is within the system-of-systems boundary, it suggests that the
system-of-systems owner can control the imposition of Type C
disruptions. Whilst this may be true for Directed Systems-of-
Systems, it is unlikely to be so for the looser/ unmanaged types
we specifically consider in this research. It is therefore
postulated that such disruptions may remain unknown or
uncontrollable until they manifest themselves with observable
impacts upon system/ system-of-system functional output.
Stemming from the same consideration of Type B
disruptions upon the system-of-systems environment, Type B
and Type D disruptions are closely related to each other,
merely representing similar consideration of systemic
disruptions but at different levels of the systemic hierarchy.
Indeed, at the more tightly controlled types of systems-of-
systems, it is expected that they will coalesce into a single
family type as control and direct management extends across
the systems within the system-of-systems. For collaborative/
virtual systems-of-systems we suggest they will only differ in
composition due to the emergent nature of properties found as
complexity and dynamism increases at the higher systemic
levels. In practice, we expect to see disruptions transition
between the two types (in either direction) depending upon
system composition, their states and how they evolve through
use over time. It is highly likely that Type B disruptions will
create Type D disruptions and vice versa as they perturbate
along intra-system relationships.
The consideration of system-of-system resilience
disruptions and the proposed new disruption types has been
conducted from an initial theoretical perspective and at mainly
a high level considering the behavioural nature of systems-of-
systems as the foundation for our investigations. To this end,
an iterative process of applying our proposed disruption types
to a case study will provide interesting and useful information
to refine the concept, including identification of common Type
A1 and Type D disruptions. Such an exercise will enable us to
examine the evolutionary nature of the disruption types, with
the potential for modelling the transition between types as a
system state evolves through use. This will be of significant
applicability to those practitioners and users who focus on
availability, reliability and maintainability properties of
systems, for example within the defence sector.
Further investigation and development of Type C
disruptions to examine the possibility of deriving heuristics or
common categories of disruption will prove useful, as will
understanding how decision making within the context of
control and management limits can modify or mitigate these
disruptions. However, whether it is possible to directly
influence and mitigate Type C disruptions within collaborative
system-of-systems (given the real world lack of oversight/
control that is difficult to replicate within an observable model/
case study) remains to be seen.
Finally, we hypothesise that it may be possible, through the
observation of deleterious effects on functional output (and
thus on performance) as they manifest themselves within a
system context, to yield increased knowledge and information
about the interconnections and relationships between the
system of interest and those around it. This means that a system
level observer, who is unaware that their system may be in a
system-of-systems, may obtain sufficient knowledge to elevate
themselves to a system-of-systems level observer with
knowledge and oversight of other related systems. In doing so,
it is theorised that this may enable a virtual system-of-systems
to transition to a collaborative one.
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